Technical Appendix to "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Sectorial Heterogeneity" by Berriel, Tiago & Sinigaglia, Daniel
Technical Appendix to “Optimal Fiscal and






11 Appendix A - The Firms’ Problem







∂Ψj (pk,t (z), .)
∂pk,t (z)
= 0; (1)












































































































2 Appendix B - Steady State
This section shows that there is a steady state characterized by zero inﬂation
and constant values for all variables, where exogenous disturbances also assume
constant values, that is: ¯ ξ = { ¯ G, ¯ ak,t}, where ¯ G > 0 and ¯ ak,t = 1, all k. We
focus particular attention to a steady state with positive real debt at maturity,
that is b∗
−1 = ¯ b∗ > ˙ 0, price dispersion equals one, ∆k,−1 = 1, and relative price
also equals one, pk,−1 = 1, all k. While ¯ b∗ is arbitrary, it is nonetheless subject
2to a upper bound. To see this, take the government budget constraint, which
in steady state is given by:
(1 − β)¯ b∗ =
K ￿
k=1
¯ τk ¯ Yk − ¯ G. (3)
Assuming debt and government expenses are non-zero in steady state imply
¯ τk > 0, for some k. Also, given pk,−1 = 1 and zero inﬂation, all k, then ¯ pk = 1.
From demand for sectorial output in terms of aggregate output, ¯ Yk = mk ¯ Y ,
which imply (3) becomes
(1 − β)¯ b∗ + ¯ G = ¯ τ ¯ Y , (4)
where ¯ τ =
￿K
k=1 mk¯ τk, once steady state values are properly replaced. From
ﬁrms’ maximizing conditions in the main text and taking into account that
¯ Πk = 1,






k ¯ Y ν
k = (1 − ¯ τk)
￿ ¯ C
￿−σ , (5)
where we have used the fact that ¯ pk = 1, ¯ ak = 1, and ¯ Yk = mk ¯ Y . Sectorial tax
rate is given by






￿σ ¯ Y ν, (6)
which only depends of aggregate variables and sector speciﬁc parameter ¯ µw
k .
We assume that steady-state wage markup is the same across sectors, that is
¯ µw
k = ¯ µw, all k. In this case, steady-state distortive tax rates are the same
across sectors, that is
¯ τk = ¯ τ, (7)
all k, which is positive whenever
θλ
θ − 1











once one considers an always-possible normalization ¯ Y = 1; that is, the level of
consumption over GDP should not be too high. Considering in a more concrete
fashion, for the parameter values used in our calibration, that is θ = 10, λ = .98,
3¯ µw = 1.05, and σ = 2, the steady state value for ¯ C should not be larger than 76%
of the GDP. We believe it does not represent a signiﬁcant restriction. Equations
θλ
θ − 1
¯ µw ¯ Y ν = (1 − ¯ τ)
￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ (8)
and (4) deﬁne the aggregate output level in steady state as well as the aggre-
gate tax rate. In (8) steady state output ¯ Y is a negative function of steady
state aggregate tax rate, industry and wage markups and a positive function
of steady state government purchase. If ¯ τ equals unity, than ¯ Y is zero and so
the government revenue. Then, it should be the case that ¯ τ < 1. Once ¯ τ is
bounded above, so should be ¯ G and ¯ b∗ for (4) to hold. On the other hand, as ¯ G
and ¯ b∗ are both greater than zero by hypothesis, then it is clear that ¯ τ > 0. Let
¯ Y1(¯ τ) and ¯ Y2(¯ τ) be the aggregate output deﬁned respectively by equations (8)
and (4), both functions of aggregate tax rate. From (8), one should notice that
¯ Y1(¯ τ) approaches ¯ G as ¯ τ approaches unity. In this case, there should be a range
of aggregate tax rates 0 < ¯ τ￿ < ¯ τ∗ < ¯ τ￿￿ < 1 such as ¯ Y1(¯ τ∗) > ¯ G/¯ τ∗, provided
¯ G are small enough. Fixing ¯ G and ¯ b∗, (4) uniquely determines ¯ Y2, for any ¯ τ∗∗
∈ (0,1). For ¯ b∗ small enough, than it should be that Y2(¯ τ∗∗) < Y1(¯ τ∗) for some
values of ¯ τ∗∗ ∈ (0,1). If, however, ¯ τ∗∗ is too small, then Y2(¯ τ∗∗) > Y1(¯ τ∗).By
continuity, it should be the case that Y2(¯ τ) = Y1(¯ τ) for a ¯ τ ∈ (0,1), which de-
termine the aggregate level of tax rate and output. Using (7), above conditions
hold for every k. Finally, from deﬁnitions for Kk, Fk and government budget
constraint in recursive terms one can deﬁne steady state values for ¯ Kk, ¯ Fk and
¯ W, which complete the characterization of the steady state values.
Deﬁne the set of commitments Xt = {Kk,t, Fk,t, Wt}, all k, and let X0
be the set of initial commitments that make policy optimal form a timeless
perspective. We wish to characterize a steady state by a constant policy and set
of initial commitments, constant debt level and tax rates, constant aggregate
and sectorial outputs, relative prices as sectorial price dispersions equal to their
initial values, that is: one. The centralized policy maker chooses a sequence of
Xt = {Πt, Πk,t, Yt, Yk,t, Fk,t, Kk,t, Wt, ∆k,t, τk,t, b∗




















































































Fk,t = (1 − τk,t)(Yt − Gt)













and taking as given the initial commitments X0 and the initial conditions
I−1 = {b∗
−1, ∆k,−1, pk,−1} for every k and t ≥ t0. In order to impose con-
stant commitments X0 = ¯ X we consider additional restrictions such as the ﬁrst
order conditions for the problem in t = t0 are equivalent to the ﬁrst order con-



















the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to equations (10) to (18). In order to
complete the proof, we need to show that ﬁrst order conditions for the indicated
steady state are satisﬁed for time-invariant Lagrange multipliers. The ﬁrst order


















































































































k,t Fk,t = 0.




















































With respect to Yk,t









t (Yt − Gt)














k,t (1 − τk,t)(Yt − Gt)
−σ pk,t = 0.

























k,t (1 − τk,t)(Yt − Gt)
−σ Yk,t = 0.













which solves for φ
1

















Optimality with respect to Wt yields
φ
9 = 0. (23)








9 = 0. (25)




















kαkθ(ν + 1) ¯ Kk − φ
8
kαk(θ − 1) ¯ Fk = 0;






¯ Kk − φ











¯ Kk = 0, (27)









FOC with respect to Yt, and using (25)




















k (1 − ¯ τk)σ
￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ−1 ¯ Yk = 0.
Using (24)













¯ Yk − ¯ G] = 0,
8￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ + φ
6σ









FOC with respect to Yk,t
−m−ν













￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ] = 0, (30)
multiplying by mk and using the deﬁnition for ¯ Yk









¯ µwmk ¯ Y ν + mk
￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ] = 0,
summing across sectors and using the relation (29) yields
−λ¯ Y ν +






¯ µw ¯ Y ν + (1 − σ)
￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ
].
It is then possible to establish the steady state value of φ




￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ − λ¯ Y ν
θλ(ν+1)
θ−1 ¯ µw ¯ Y ν + (1 − σ)
￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ, (31)
Having determined the value for φ







k using (30), φ
8




k using respectively (22) and
(21).
FOCs with respect to pk,t yields
− φ
3mk(1 − η)β + φ
4




6 ￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ ¯ τk ¯ Yk − φ
8
k (1 − ¯ τk)
￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ ¯ Yk = 0,
using (24)
−φ
3mk(1 − η)β + φ
4
k(1 − β) + φ
5
k − φ
6 ￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ ¯ Y mk = 0, (32)
summing across sectors
−φ











6 ￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ ¯ Y = 0, (33)






￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ = φ
6(1 − σ)
￿¯ Y − ¯ G
￿−σ , (34)
which solves for φ
3 as we use as a function only of aggregate variables, as we




k can be determined by (26). Finally, φ
4
k can be
determined using (32). It follows the system is just determined which completes
the proof.
3 Appendix C - Second Order Approximation
to Utility Function
3.1 Second Order Approximation of Utility Function
We start with a second order Taylor expansion of the representative consumer’s


























and where ξt refers to the full vector of random disturbances, as in Benigno and
Woodford (2003). We start by working with u(Yt,ξt). A second order Taylor
expansion over original expression yields
u(Yt,ξt) = uY (¯ Y ,¯ ξ)(Yt − ¯ Y ) +
1
2
uY Y (¯ Y ,¯ ξ)(Yt − ¯ Y )2+
+ uY ξ(¯ Y ,¯ ξ)(Yt − ¯ Y )(ξt − ¯ ξ) + tips + O3
p,
where the term tips refers to terms independent of policy hereafter.
u(Yt,ξt) = uY (¯ Y ,¯ ξ)¯ Y [





uY Y (¯ Y ,¯ ξ)¯ Y
uY (¯ Y ,¯ ξ)
(Yt − ¯ Y )2
¯ Y 2 +
+
uY ξ(¯ Y ,¯ ξ)¯ Y
uY (¯ Y ,¯ ξ)
(Yt − ¯ Y )
¯ Y
(ξt − ¯ ξ)
¯ Y
] + tips + O3
p.
10Deﬁne hereafter, for any variable Xt
˜ Xt ≡








It is know that the following relation holds up to second order:





Given the functional form assumed for the utility function, we have:









˜ Yt˜ ξt] + tips + O3
p,
where ˆ ξt represents the absolute deviation over GDP. As Gt is the only random
disturbance considered in this case, than it is clear that
˜ ξt = ˜ Gt =
Gt − ¯ G
¯ Y
,





and use (40), yielding




t (1 − σs
−1
C ) + σs
−1
C ˆ Yt ˆ Gt] + tips + O3
p. (42)





(∆k.t − 1) + vYk
￿¯ Yk,¯ ξ
￿







(Yk,t − ¯ Yk)2 + vYk
￿¯ Yk,¯ ξ
￿




(Yk,t − ¯ Yk)(ξt − ¯ ξ) + vξ
￿¯ Yk,¯ ξ
￿
(∆k.t − 1)(ξt − ¯ ξ)+
+ tips + O3
p.
Considering that in this component of utility function, the vector ξt contains
only non-zero terms for disturbances ak,t and that ¯ ak = 1, all k, then
˜ ak,t = ak,t − 1,
11and also
˜ ∆k,t = ∆k,t − 1.
Expression above (43) simpliﬁes to
v(Yk,t,ξt)∆k.t = v
￿¯ Yk,¯ ξ
￿ ˜ ∆k.t + vYk
￿¯ Yk,¯ ξ










￿ ¯ Y 2
k (ˆ Y 2
k,t) + vYk
￿¯ Yk,¯ ξ
￿ ¯ Yk(ˆ Yk,t)˜ ∆k.t +
+vYkξ
￿¯ Yk,¯ ξ
￿ ¯ Yk(ˆ Yk,tˆ ak,t) + vξ
￿¯ Yk,¯ ξ
￿ ˜ ∆k.t(ˆ ak,t) +
+tips + O3
p,
where we have used the relation (40) for both ˆ ak,t and ˆ Yk,t. Using the deﬁni-
tion for ∆k,t one can show that ˜ ∆k,t is a term of second order. In this sense,
interactions between ˜ ∆k,t and ˆ ak,t or ˜ ∆k,t and ˆ Yk,t can be ignored for they are
















































k (qk,t − ¯ qk) + O2
p, (47)





































12due to the deﬁnition of sectorial price index, then we have:
˜ ∆k,t = ∆k,t − 1 = O2
p.
Hence, expression (44) simpliﬁes to
v(Yk,t,ξt)∆k.t = v
￿¯ Yk,¯ ξ
￿ ˜ ∆k.t + vYk
￿¯ Yk,¯ ξ









￿ ¯ Y 2
k (ˆ Y 2
k,t) + vYkξ
￿¯ Yk,¯ ξ
￿ ¯ Yk(ˆ Yk,tˆ ak,t)+

















where we have used the relation







˜ ∆k,t = ˆ ∆k,t + O3
p,
once one notice that ˆ ∆2
k,t is of higher order than O2
p. Using a second order
Taylor expansion over the law of motion for sectorial price dispersion given by
∆k.t = αkΠ
θ(1+ν)














θ(1 + ν)(1 + θν)ˆ Π2
k,t + O3
p,
where interactions between ˆ ∆k.t−1 and ˆ Πk.t have been explicitly considered as
of third order. Using the relation:





We have, up to second order,





θ(1 + ν)(1 + θν)π2
k,t + O3
p,
where πk,t is the percent variation of sectorial price level, or best known as
13sectorial inﬂation, πk,t = logPk,t/Pk,t−1. Interacting backwards yields
ˆ ∆k.t = α
t−1













while we consider the sectorial price dispersion in the remote past as a "term in-
dependent of policy". Further considering that it is possible to change positions






































(1 − αk)(1 − αkβ)





k,t + tips + O3
p. (55)










(1 − αk)(1 − αkβ)
π2





k,t − (1 + ν)ˆ Yk,tˆ ak,t} + tips + O3
p,
where we have beneﬁted from the possibility of swapping sums of t and k. Using





k ¯ Y ν









= [ ¯ C−σ ¯ Y ](1 − Φ),
where
(1 − Φ) ≡
θ − 1
θ
(1 − ¯ τ)
¯ µw ,
where the last equality is due to relation (7). These last deﬁnitions lead to (35)






(1 − ˜ σ)
2
ˆ Y 2















−(1 + ν)ˆ Yk,tˆ ak,t]} + tips + O3
p,
where
Ω ≡ ¯ C−σ ¯ Y , (57)
κk ≡
(1 − αk)(1 − αkβ)
(1 + θν)αk
, (58)




(1 − Φ) ≡
θ − 1
θ
(1 − ¯ τ)
¯ µw , (60)
as above.
3.2 Second Order Approximation to AS Equation
























ˆ Vk,t = ˆ Fk,t − ˆ Kk,t, (63)
where we used the deﬁnition (39). Using a second order Taylor expansion over
15ˆ Vk,t:








2{(θ − 1) − (1 − α)}(Π2
k,t) + O3
p. (64)
Using (53), one obtain:



















where s ≥ t is some date in the future and Pk,t the aggregate price level in





























where the term ˆ kk,t can be deﬁned as
ˆ kk,j = θ(1 + ν)πk,t,j + (1 + ν)ˆ Yk,j − (1 + ν)ˆ ak,j + ˆ µ
w
k,t, (68)
as we have used the relation in (40) for variables ˜ Πk,t,j, ˜ Yk,t and ˜ ak,t. Using the















Taking the expression in the text for Fk,t given by (17), we deﬁne the net
revenue factor as
Γk,t ≡ 1 − τk,t. (70)








16We apply a second order Taylor expansion over (17) which yields










where ˜ Fk,t follows (38) and we deﬁne ˆ fk,t as
ˆ fk,j = ˆ Γk,j − σ ˆ Cj + ˆ Yk,j + ˆ pk,j + (θ − 1)πk,t,j, (73)
where hat variables correspond to their deﬁnitions in (39). More explicitly,
ˆ Γk,t = log
1 − τk,t






















We can subtract (65) from (76) yielding
















































k,t + ˆ K2
k,t} + O3
p.




















































ˆ fk,j − ˆ kk,j
￿￿




Using the deﬁnitions for ˆ fk,t and ˆ kk,t, we have
ˆ fk,j − ˆ kk,j = ˆ Γk,j − σ ˆ Cj − νˆ Yk,j + ˆ pk,j − (1 + θν)πk,t,j + (1 + ν)ˆ ak,j − ˆ µ
w
k,t,
ˆ fk,j+ˆ kk,j = ˆ Γk,j−σ ˆ Cj+(2+ν)ˆ Yk,j+ˆ pk,j+[(θ − 1)+θ(1+ν)]πk,t,j−(1+ν)ˆ ak,j+ˆ µ
w
k,t,
For convenience, we can also deﬁne
ˆ fk,j + ˆ kk,j = ˆ Xk,j + [(θ − 1) + θ(1 + ν)]πk,t,j, (81)
where




ˆ fk,j − ˆ kk,j = zk,j − (1 + θν)πk,t,j, (83)
where
zk,j = ˆ Γk,j − σ ˆ Cj − ν ˆ Yk,j + ˆ pk,j + (1 + ν)ˆ ak,j − ˆ µ
w
k,t. (84)


































ˆ Xk,j + [(θ − 1) + θ(1 + ν)]πk,t,j
￿
}. (85)

















j−t [zk,j − (1 + θν)πk,t,j]
￿











ˆ Vk,tZk,t + O3
p.
Taking the lead, multiplying by αkβ and then subtracting from expression
above yields:
(1 + θν)
(θ − 1)(1 − βαk)
￿



















j−t [zk,j − (1 + θν)πk,t,j]
￿










j−t−1 [zk,j − (1 + θν)πk,t+1,j]
￿



















k,t+1 − 2πk,t+1πk,t,j, (86)
one gets
(1 + θν)
(θ − 1)(1 − βαk)
￿
















j−t−1 {zk,j[(θ − 1)+θ(1+ν)](πk,t+1)−[1+θν](πk,t+1) ˆ Xk,j+













πk,t,j = πk,t+1 + πk,t+1,j,
expression above simpliﬁes to
(1 + θν)
(θ − 1)(1 − βαk)
￿












































Using the deﬁnition for Zk,t, expression simpliﬁes to
20(1 + θν)
(θ − 1)(1 − βαk)
￿




















(1 + θν)[(θ − 1) + θ(1 + ν)]
αkβ


















where we have used the fact that, from (80) and from the deﬁnition of ˆ fk,t−ˆ kk,t:
(1 + θν)
(θ − 1)(1 − βαk)







We can use the deﬁnition for ˆ Vk,t in (65) and replace above, also discharging
the terms O3











































[πk,tZk,t − αkβEt[πk,t+1Zk,t+1]] + O3
p,
where we have deﬁned κk as
κk =









































Multiplying both sides for −κk allow us to write above expression as
Vk,t = −κk{zk,t +
1
2




k,t + βEtVk,t+1 + O3
p. (89)
where:













and zk,t, ˆ Xk,t and Zk,t are give, respectively, by (84), (82), (85). A second order
Taylor expansion of log(1 − τk,t) allows us to relate (74) with the original tax
rate variables:
log(1 − τk,t) = log(1 − ¯ τ) −
¯ τ





(1 − ¯ τ)2˜ τ2
k,t + O3
p,
ˆ Γk,t = −δˆ τk,t −
δ










1 − ¯ τ
. (91)
Also, a log-linearization of
Ct = Yt − Gt
yields



















C ) ˆ G2
t +s
−2
C ˆ Yt ˆ Gt+O3
p, (92)
where
sC = ¯ C/¯ Y .
22Using both results, one can redeﬁne zk,t and ˆ Xk,t as:




(1 − ¯ τ)
ˆ τ
2
k,t + (2 + ν)ˆ Yk,t + ˆ pk,t − (1 + ν)ˆ ak,t + ˆ µ
w
k,t (93)






C ˆ Yt ˆ Gt} + tips + O3
p,
and




(1 − ¯ τ)
ˆ τ
2
k,t − ν ˆ Yk,t + ˆ pk,t + (1 + ν)ˆ ak,t − ˆ µ
w
k,t (94)








C ˆ Yt ˆ Gt} + tips + O3
p,
where ˜ σ is deﬁned as in (59) and also noting that ˆ pk,t relates to sectorial and
aggregate outputs following
ˆ pk,t = η−1(ˆ Yt − ˆ Yk,t).












k,t} + tips + O3
p (95)
where Vk,t is deﬁned in (90), ˆ Xk,t in (93) and zk,t in (94). One could ﬁnally
note that a ﬁrst order approximation to (63) yields the known Phillips Curve
of the form:
πk,t = κk{(˜ σ − η−1)ˆ Yt + (ν + η−1)ˆ Yk,t + δˆ τk,t (96)
−˜ σ ˆ Gt − (1 + ν)ˆ ak,t + ˆ µ
w
k,t} + βEtπk,t+1 + O2
p.
3.3 Second Order Approximation to the Budget Constraint
We approximate the intertemporal government budget restriction by a second
order Taylor expansion. We take the deﬁnition of government’s intertemporal
















t as the real value at maturity of government debt in terms of one-period
riskless bond, or b∗




τk,tpk,tYk,t − Gt. (99)
Expanding (97) yields:




j−t{−σ ˜ Ct + ˜ st +
1
2
σ(σ + 1) ˜ C2
t − σ ˜ Ct˜ st} + O3
p, (100)





We can use relation (40) in order to simplify equation above to:








t − σ ˆ C˜ st} + O3
p, (102)
where hat variables are deﬁned as in (39). In this sense, ˜ Wt can be deﬁned in
terms of log variables using the relation given (40). Using logs over (98), ˆ Wt
can be deﬁned as:
ˆ Wt = ˆ b∗
t−1 − σ ˆ Ct − πt, (103)
where hat variables are deﬁned as log deviations from steady state levels. Once
˜ W = ˆ W +
1
2
ˆ W + O3
p, (104)
holds, we have:
˜ Wt = ˆ b∗




t−1 − σ ˆ Ct − πt)2 + O3
p. (105)
We should also deﬁne ˜ st in terms of log deviations from steady state levels.




mk¯ τ[(ˆ τk+ ˆ pk,t+ ˆ Yk,t)+
1
2






24where hat variables are log deviations from steady state values and we have used










¯ τ ¯ Yk − ¯ G = ¯ τ ¯ Y − ¯ G. (108)
Finally, for mathematical convenience, we choose to redeﬁne (102) by mul-
tiplying both sides by sd:








t − σ ˆ Csd˜ st} + O3
p.
(109)
Hence, the second order approximation for the intertemporal budget con-
straint can be obtained by replacing (92), (105), (106) into (109). One can
notice that a ﬁrst order approximation yields:
ˆ b∗










mk¯ τ[ˆ τk + ˆ pk,t + ˆ Yk,t]+
+ (˜ σ − s
−1
d ) ˆ Gt − ˜ σˆ Yt} + tips + O2
p,
where, as underlined elsewhere, ˆ pk,t is a function of sectorial and overall outputs
and ˜ σ and sd are, respectively, deﬁned in (59) and (107).
3.4 Aggregate and Sectorial Output Relation








ˆ pk,t = η−1(ˆ Yt − ˆ Yk,t). (111)
which establishes an exact (inverse) relation between sector relative price and






































mk ˆ Y 2
k,t + O3
p. (115)
4 Appendix D - Elimination of Linear Terms
4.1 Matrix Notation
We start by deﬁning
x￿
t =







￿ ˆ Gt ˆ a1,t ... ˆ aK,t ˆ µ
w





For notational convenience, we also deﬁne the following terms:
υ ≡ 1 + ν, (118)
ωη ≡ 1 − η−1, (119)
χ ≡ ν + η−1, (120)
˜ σ ≡ σs
−1
C , (121)
ς ≡ ˜ σ − η−1, (122)
26δ ≡
¯ τ





¯ Y − ¯ C
¯ C
≡ −ωC, (124)
in addition to the terms deﬁned elsewhere:
sC ≡ ¯ C/¯ Y , (125)
sd ≡ ¯ s/¯ Y . (126)












tAξξt} + tips + O3
p, (127)
where Ax, Axx, and Aξ are, respectively, (3K +1)×1, (3K +1)×(3K +1) and






















xx is a 1 × 1 matrix such as
A11
xx = −(1 − ˜ σ),
A22





kk = mk(1 − Φ)υ,
A33

























ξ = −˜ σ
and A22





kk = −mk(1 − Φ)υ,
and where we have observed the following deﬁnitions:
Ω ≡ ¯ C−σ ¯ Y ,
κk ≡
(1 − αk)(1 − αkβ)
(1 + θν)αk
,
(1 − Φ) ≡
θ − 1
θ
(1 − ¯ τ)
¯ µw .
The Sectorial Phillips Curve expressed in (95) can also be written in matrix
notation. We start by substituting expressions for ˆ pk,t into deﬁnitions for zk,t
and ˆ Xk,t, underlined in (94) and (93). Our aim is to separate quadratic and
linear terms. Quadratic and linear terms of random disturbances are placed











tCξ,kξt} + tips + O3
p, (131)
for a generic sector k. As in (127), matrices Cx,k, Cxx,k, and Cξ,k have, respec-






















28and zeros elsewhere, C14￿





























xx,k is 1 × 1 matrix
C11
xx,k = −κk[˜ σωC + ς2]
for every k, C12






and zeros elsewhere, all k, and C12￿
xx,k = C21
xx,k; C14






and zero otherwise, for all k, and C41
xx,k = C14￿
xx,k; C22
xx,k is K×K diagonal matrix





kk = χκk(υ + ωη)
C33




















for every k, and C42
xx,k = C24￿


















ξ,k is 1 × 1 matrix, such that
C11
ξ,k = κk[ωC + ˜ σ + ωη]˜ σ
29for every k; C21





1k = −κkωη˜ σ
and zero elsewhere, C22






and zero elsewhere, C23






and zero otherwise, C41





k1 = κkδ˜ σ−1
and zero elsewhere. We recall the deﬁnition for δ as
δ ≡
¯ τ
1 − ¯ τ
in addition to the deﬁnitions from (118) to (126).
The government budget constraint can also be simpliﬁed in matrix notation.
Taking expression given in (102), we eliminate references for ˆ pk,t, and replace ˆ Ct
and ˜ st for their expressions in terms of endogenous variables xt and exogenous
processes ξt. Grouping linear and quadratic terms, yields:










tBξξt} + tips + O3
p (135)
where, as in (127) and (131), matrices Bx, Bxx, and Bξ are, respectively, of





























xx is 1 × 1 matrix such as
B11
xx = ˜ σsd(ωC + ˜ σ) − ςη−1¯ τ,
for every k, B12































kk = ωηmk¯ τ,
every k, and B42
xx = B24￿
xx ; and B44






















ξ is a 1 × 1 matrix such that
B11
ξ = ˜ ση−1¯ τ − ˜ σsd(s
−1
C − ˜ σ),
for every k, B21





k1 = ˜ σωηmk¯ τ,
every k, B41





k1 = ˜ σmk¯ τ,
every k.












where we have used the fact that the deﬁnition for aggregate output in terms of
its sectorial counterparts expressed in (115) is valid at all dates. Matrices Hx












1 0 0 0
0 H22
xx 0 0
0 0 0 0












4.2 Elimination of Linear Terms



































where we have used the fact that ¯ τ = ¯ τk, all k, and deﬁned:
Φ ≡ 1 −
θ − 1
θ
(1 − ¯ τ)
¯ µw ,
Υ ≡ (ς + χ)(1 − ¯ τ) + ˜ σsd − ¯ τ, (146)
Ξ ≡ ς(1 − ¯ τ) + ˜ σsd − ¯ τη−1 (147)







































































































































xx is a 1 × 1 matrix such as
Q11




































k mk{(1 − Φ) +
Φ
Υ
(1 − ¯ τ)υ},
Q44








mk(1 − ¯ τ)δ +
Φ
Υ
mk¯ τ = 0,
Q12




















ςmk{(1 − ¯ τ)δ − ¯ τ} = 0,
and Q41
xx = Q14￿
xx; and, ﬁnally, Q24









ωη[mk(1 − ¯ τ)δ − mk¯ τ] = 0,
and Q42
xx = Q24￿


















ξ is a 1 × 1 matrix such as
Q11






[˜ ση−1¯ τ − ˜ σsd(s−1
C − ˜ σ)],
Q22





kk = −mk{(1 − Φ)υ +
Φ
Υ
(1 − ¯ τ)υ2},
Q21





k1 = −ωη˜ σ
Φ
Υ
mk(1 − ¯ τ) −
Φ
Υ













(1 − ¯ τ)υ,
and Q41
ξ a K × 1 dimension matrix of null elements once its typical kth-line








˜ σ{mk(1 − ¯ τ)δ − mk¯ τ} = 0.
As in Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Ferrero (2005), references to sector
tax rates have been eliminated. These are important for welfare considerations
only to the extent they inﬂuence the wedge between desired and actual levels of
sectorial and aggregate outputs. Only references to sectorial inﬂation measures,
sectorial and aggregate outputs remain, which imply (150) can be simpliﬁed
further by getting rid-oﬀ tax rates references and by separating terms referring
to sectorial and overall outputs from references to sectorial inﬂation. Proceeding









y,t ˜ Qyxy,t +2x￿
y,t ˜ Qξξt +x￿
π,t ˜ Qπxπ,t}+Tt0 +tips+O3
p,
(154)
where xy,t is a K + 1 × 1 vector containing only references to aggregate and
sectorial outputs measures, or
35x￿
y,t =
￿ ˆ Yt ˆ Y1,t ... ˆ YK,t
￿
,


































where accurate speciﬁcations for submatrices Qij
xx and Q
ij
ξ are given in (152)
and (153). From (154), we now focus on the term
x￿









where q terms are deﬁned according to

























Under the assumption that wage markups is steady state as well as markups
over marginal costs are the same across sectors (¯ µw
k = ¯ µw and θk = θ) , q
coeﬃcients are all independent of k. We use the following proposition in order
to simplify (155) further:
Proposition 1 The following expression relating sum of sectorial output vari-




mk ˆ Yk,t −
K ￿
k=1
mk ˆ Y 2
k,t = O3
p.










mk ˆ Y 2
k,t − ˆ Y 2
t ) + O3
p. (159)
On the other hand, from the deﬁnition of sectorial demand it is possible to
establish the following exact relation:
ˆ pk,t = η−1(ˆ Yt − ˆ Yk,t). (160)
Summing across sectors yields:
K ￿
k=1
mkˆ pk,t = η−1(ˆ Yt −
K ￿
k=1
mk ˆ Yk,t). (161)



























t − 2ˆ Yt
K ￿
k=1
mk ˆ Yk,t +
K ￿
k=1
mk ˆ Y 2
k,t) + O3
p. (163)
Comparing (159) and (163) yields the result.
Given proposition above, (155) is equivalent to:
x￿










yk = qyk + 2qy,yk.
We now focus on the second term of (154), containing the interactions be-
tween endogenous variables and exogenous processes:
x￿
y,t ˜ Qξξt = qyGˆ Yt ˆ Gt + qykG
K ￿
k=1
mkYk,t ˆ Gt +
K ￿
k=1
mk ˆ Yk,t[qykakˆ ak,t + qykµkˆ µk,t].
(165)
37where coeﬃcients deﬁned as






˜ σ[η−1¯ τ − sd(s
−1
C − ˜ σ)], (166)
qykak = −(1 − Φ)υ −
Φ
Υ
(1 − ¯ τ)υ2, (167)







(1 − ¯ τ)υ (169)
are all independent of sector-speciﬁc characteristics.




mk ˆ Yk,t = O2
p.
Proof. Follows directly from (115).
From above, the following holds:




mkYk,t] ˆ Gt = O3
p.
Proof. From proposition above plus the fact that all exogenous processes are
O1
p.
From (165), one can use above to get:
x￿








ykG = qyG + qykG.
We now focus our attention on (164). The following lemma can help us
simplify the expression even further.





mk ˆ Y 2
k,t = O3
p.




mk ˆ Yk,t −
K ￿
k=1
mk ˆ Y 2
k,t = O3
p. (171)




mk ˆ Yk,t = O2
p. (172)





mk ˆ Y 2
k,t = O3
p,
















Applying the last Proposition above:
x￿











Replacing (170) and (174) over (154) yields the expression for the second
















k,t} + Tt0 + tips + O3
p,
where






yk [(qyG + qykG) ˆ Gt + qykakˆ ak,t + qykµkˆ µk,t] (175)
all k, and, most importantly,
λyk ≡ qyk + 2qy,yk + qy, (176)
λk,π ≡ θκ−1
k {(1 − Φ) +
Φ
Υ
(1 − ¯ τ)υ} (177)
while terms such as qyk, qy , and qy,yk are deﬁned from (156) to (158) and terms
such as qyG, qykG, qykak and qykµk are deﬁned from (166) to (169).
5 Appendix E - Concavity
The concavity properties of the second order quadratic approximation for the
utility function depend largely on the parameter values chosen. We are partic-
ular interested in determining the set of conditions that allow the second order
approximation to yield a unique solution to the approximated Ramsey problem.
Suﬃcient condition for concavity can be obtained if λ-coeﬃcients deﬁned in the




k mk{(1 − Φ) +
Φ
Υ
(1 − ¯ τ)υ} > 0,
all k, which holds if
(1 − Φ) +
Φ
Υ
(1 − ¯ τ)υ > 0.
The terms 1−Φ and 1−¯ τ will always be positive provided a upper bound for
tax rates in steady state. Considering also the implausibility of negative values
for the inverse of Frisch elasticity, then υ > 0. Φ is bounded bellow by ¯ τ, which
is always great than zero. A suﬃcient condition for λk,π > 0 is having a set of
parameter values such as Υ > 0, or
(ς + χ)(1 − ¯ τ) + ˜ σsd > ¯ τ,
which will always hold provided tax rates are not excessively high and once we
consider that ν, ˜ σ and sd are all positive.
Having considered the conditions upon which the coeﬃcients over inﬂation
variance are positive, we turn now to the conditions that ensure that the coeﬃ-
cients over sectorial output variances are also positive. We carry out a numerical
40analysis of the sensibility of values of λyk under the baseline calibration, largely
based of Rotemberge and Woodford (1998), Benigno and Woodford (2003) and
Ferrero (2005). That is characterized by: a wage markup in steady state (¯ µk)
of 5%, a λ set to .98, a within sector elasticity of substitution (θ) of 10, a gov-
ernment expenses over GDP ( ¯ G/¯ Y ) of 25%, β of 99%, which corresponds to
steady state interest rate of 4.1% year, a government primary surplus over GDP
(¯ s) of 2.5%, a Frisch elasticity of labor supply (ν) of .47, a coeﬃcient of risk
aversion (σ) of 2 and a cross-sector elasticity of substitution (η) of 4.5. The two
graphs below present suﬃcient conditions for concavity (i.e.: λyk > 0) of the
linear-quadratic approximation to the utility function as some key parameter
values change. In the ﬁrst graph we contrast diﬀerent values for the elasticity
of substitution across sectors with steady state tax rate levels, while keeping
the other parameters conﬁned to the basic calibration. Steady state taxation
level is conﬁned between 5% to 50% of GDP, for a constant primary surplus of
2.5%. One should note that either changes in steady state taxation levels nor
changes in the elasticity of substitution across sectors aﬀect suﬃcient conditions
for concavity in a signiﬁcant extent. Concavity fails only when η is close to zero.
Figure1: Suﬃcient Conditions for Concavity as a function of Cross-Sector
Elasticity of Substitution and Steady State Tax Rate.
The following graph explores suﬃcient conditions for concavity for a variety
of diﬀerent values on the degree of risk aversion and on the elasticity of sub-
stitution across-sectors, while we ﬁx the steady state tax rate level at 25% of
GDP and a primary surplus of 2.5%. Other parameter values equal those of
the baseline calibration. Concavity of utility function is attained for reason-
able parameters of risk aversion and substitution elasticity amongst goods from
diﬀerent sectors.
41Figure 2: Suﬃcient Conditions for Concavity as a function of Cross-Sector
Elasticity of Substitution and Risck Aversion
6 Appendix F - Log-linear Approximation of Re-
strictions
6.1 Deﬁnition of Target Variables
Explicitly using the assumption that sector speciﬁc tax rates as well as wage
markups in steady state are the same across sectors, we can deﬁne the target









yk [(qyG + qykG) ˆ Gt + qykakˆ at + qykµkˆ µt] (179)















6.2 Aggregate supply and cost-push disturbance term
We take the ﬁrst order terms of AS equation in (95), valid for all k.
πk,t = κk{(˜ σ − η−1)ˆ Yt + (ν + η−1)ˆ Yk,t + δˆ τk,t
−˜ σ ˆ Gt − (1 + ν)ˆ ak,t + ˆ µ
w
k,t} + βEtπk,t+1 + O2
p.
Adding and subtracting, respectively, the terms referring to overall and sec-
torial output targets with the appropriate coeﬃcients yield
πk,t = κk{(˜ σ−η−1)yt+(ν+η−1)yk,t+δ(ˆ τk,t−ˆ τ
∗
k,t)}+βEtπk,t+1+uk,t, (180)
for every k, where the deﬁnition for the cost-push term uk,t is given by








k,t = −[(˜ σ + ν)λ
−1





−(˜ σ − η−1)λ
−1
yk qykakˆ at − [(ν + η−1)λ
−1
yk qykak + (1 + ν)]ˆ ak,t.
can be understood as the target level for distortive taxation in sector k. Aver-
aging across sectors allows us to determine the generalized aggregate ﬁrst order




mkκk{(˜ σ−η−1)yt+(ν+η−1)yk,t+δ(ˆ τk,t−ˆ τ
∗
k,t)+uk,t}+βEtπt+1 (183)
6.3 Budget Constraint and ﬁscal disturbance term
We start by taking a ﬁrst order approximation to expression (109), yielding
ˆ b∗









mk[ˆ τk+ωη ˆ Yk,t]+bG ˆ Gt},
(184)
where we have deﬁned for convenience the terms by and bG, respectively, as
43by ≡ s
−1
d ¯ τη−1 − ˜ σ,
and
bG ≡ ˜ σ − s
−1
d .
Expression (184) can be written in recursive terms. Using the deﬁnition
for aggregate output in terms of sectorial outputs and the deﬁnitions for target
variables given in (175) and (182), we get:
ˆ b∗




mk(ˆ τk,t −ˆ τ
∗
k,t)+βEt[ˆ b∗
t − ˜ σyt+1 −πt+1],
(185)
where












k,t]+ ˜ σβEt(ˆ Y ∗
t+1 − ˆ Gt+1),
(186)
is a combination of exogenous processes. ζt can be redeﬁning in terms of struc-
tural shocks as
ζt = ωG
1 ˆ Gt + ωa





2 Et ˆ Gt+1 − ωa















2 ≡ β˜ σ[1 + λ
−1
yk (qyG + qykG)],
ωa
1 ≡ ˜ byλ
−1
yk qykak − (1 − β)(1 − ¯ τ)s−1
d [(˜ σ + ν)λ
−1
yk qykak + (1 + ν)],
ωa







yk qykµk[˜ by − (1 − β)(1 − ¯ τ)s−1




2 ≡ ˜ σβλ
−1
yk qykµk.
446.4 Aggregate and Sectorial Output Relation











6.5 Euler Equation and Equilibrium Interest Rate
Taking the ﬁrst order approximation of the Euler equation in the main text
yields
ˆ Rt = ˜ σEt∆ˆ Yt+1 − ˜ σEt∆ ˆ Gt+1 + Etπt+1 + O2
p,
where we have used the relation in (92) to substitute for ˆ Ct in terms of ˆ Yt and
ˆ Gt. Expressing equilibrium interest rates in terms of aggregate output gap by
using deﬁnition in (175), which yields
ˆ Rt = ˜ σEt∆yt+1 + Etπt+1 − ˜ σ[λ
−1
yk (qyG + qykG) + 1]Et∆ ˆ Gt+1+
− ˜ σλ
−1
yk qykakEt∆ˆ at+1 − ˜ σλ
−1
yk qykµkEt∆ˆ µt+1 + O2
p,
7 Appendix G - Optimal Solution with Commit-
ment
For simplicity, deﬁne:
ˇ τk,t ≡ ˆ τk,t − ˆ τ
∗
k,t.




















































t denotes the multiplier of equation referred to variable x and where
the last line correspond to the preconditions that allow the problem to be valid
for all t ≥ 0. As usual for a cashless economy case, the Euler equation deﬁning
equilibrium interest rate as a function of exogenous shocks and evolution of
aggregate product is not relevant, serving only to determine the equilibrium
interest rates once optimal paths for sectorial outputs and inﬂations as well as
tax rates and debt level are already chosen. FOCs are given by:























k,tκk(˜ σ − η−1) − Mb
t˜ by + Mb
t−1˜ σ + M
y
t = 0. (191)
With respect to yk,t
λykyk,t − Mπ
k,t[κk(ν + η−1)] − M
y
t = 0. (192)





plus the problem’s constraints. Substituting (189) and (190) into (188) yields
























t = ˜ Φ1Mb
t − ˜ Φ2Mb
t−1, (195)
where
˜ Φ1 = ˜ by − (1 − ¯ τ)(1 − β)s−1
d (˜ σ − η−1),
˜ Φ2 = ˜ σ.
Taking (192), replacing for Mπ







yk [˜ Φ1 − (1 − ¯ τ)(1 − β)s−1




which establishes a relation between sectorial output and aggregate variables.





where we deﬁned coeﬃcients Σ1 and Σ2, respectively as:
Σ1 ≡ ϕ1,
Σ2 ≡ ϕ2.
where deﬁnitions for ϕ coeﬃcients are give elsewhere.
We now use (197), (196) and (194) over the sectorial Phillips Curve in order





t−1) − κk(˜ σ − η−1)(Σ1Mb
t − Σ2Mb
t−1)+
− κk(ν + η−1)(ϕ1Mb
t − ϕ2Mb




t ) = uk,t.
Using (193):




t−1) − κk(˜ σ − η−1)(Σ1Mb
t − Σ2Mb
t−1)+




ˇ τk,t = φk,1Mb
t − φk,2Mb
t−1 − (κkδ)−1uk,t, (198)
where we have deﬁned:
φk,1 = (κkδ)−1{ψ
π
k − κk(˜ σ − η−1)Σ1 − κk(ν + η−1)ϕ1},
φk,2 = (κkδ)−1{ψ
π
k − κk(˜ σ − η−1)Σ2 − κk(ν + η−1)ϕ2}.
Finally, we considering government constraint. We use (197), (196), (194),






























k] + ζt = 0
Using (193) and by isolating terms Mb
t and Mb
t−1, it is possible to establish





t−1 − ˜ Ω1Mb






where we have deﬁned
˜ Ω1 ≡ β
−1{(˜ by − β˜ σ)Σ1 + ψ






48˜ Ω2 ≡ β
−1{(˜ by − β˜ σ)Σ2 + ψ
















7.1 Determinacy under optimal policy
In order to prove determinacy we take the set of expressions resulting from
solving the set of ﬁrst order conditions and restrictions applied for the problem
above. In this sense, we take (193), (194), (197), (196), (198), and (199) , and
write in terms of the following system of equations:
Γ0Etzt+1 = Γ1zt + εt+1, (200)
where the vector for the system’s variables can be described as:
zt =















         

,
where notation D xk,t refers to the full set of sectorial variables x. This disposition
of variables allow to write Γ1 as an inferior triangular matrices whose eigenvalues
lie in the main diagonal. Matrix Γ1 can be deﬁned as
Γ1 =

         

1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
1 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
ψ
π −ψ





k 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Σ1 −Σ2 0 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗
D ϕ1 −D ϕ2 0 0 0 0 ∗ ∗
D φk,1 −D φk,2 0 0 0 0 0 ∗
−˜ Ω1 ˜ Ω2 0 0 0 0 0 β
−1

         

49and there are two non-zero eigenvalues, 1, stable, and β
−1, unstable. Matrix Γ1
is an identity matrix, whose eigenvalues equal one. We can redeﬁne (200) as
Etzt+1 = Γ
−1
0 Γ1zt + Γ
−1
0 εt+1. (201)
Because Γ0 is identity, Γ−1
0 is identity, and therefore Γ−1
0 Γ1 has the same
eigenvalues of Γ1, one unstable, and other stable. As they match the number
of forward looking and backward looking variables, this fact alone allows us to
establish determinacy for (200).
Finally, it is relevant to notice that under commitment, optimal solution
imply that policy is conducted such a way that:
Etπk,t+1 = 0, (202)
every k. It is somewhat a more strict condition than for an economy with
homogeneous stickiness. In order to see this, we take leads in (194), apply
expectation and use relation (193). In its turn, (202) for every k imply the
same behavior for aggregate inﬂation, or:
Etπt+1 = 0. (203)




















Using (198), we deﬁne optimal sectorial taxation as a function of date t
sectorial inﬂation and output, as well as aggregate output.
ˆ τk,t = (κkδ)−1{πk,t − κkςyt − κkχyk,t − uk,t} (206)
8 Appendix H: Cost-Push - Homogeneous Tax-
ation
The following ﬁgure presents the response of aggregate variables to a cost-push
shock in the median stickiness sector:









Response of Aggregate Taxation to




Heterog. Stickiness - Small Variance
Heterog. Stickiness - High Variance









Response of Aggregate Output to
a Cost-Push Shock on the Median Sector











Response of Aggregate Inflation to
a Cost-Push Shock on the Median Sector






Response of Public Debt to
a Cost-Push Shock on the Median Sector
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